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Abstract 
This article studies the formation process of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – 
the most important Chinese foreign policy initiative under Xi Jinping. It argues that 
the BRI was put forward as a broad policy idea that was subsequently developed with 
relatively concrete content. During this process, the shifting international landscapes 
have gradually driven the BRI from a periphery strategy into a global initiative. By 
examining the case of Jiangsu Province, this article also shows how Chinese local 
governments have actively deployed their preferred narratives to influence and (re-
)interpret the BRI guidelines of the central government in order to advance their own 
interests. As a result, this produces a variety of competing, ambiguous and 
contradictory policy narratives of the BRI within China, which undermines the 
Chinese central government’s monopoly on the BRI narratives. This leaves the BRI as 
a very vague and broad policy slogan that is subject to change and open to 
interpretation. In this regard, the existing analyses – that consider the BRI as Beijing’s 
masterplan to achieve its geopolitical goals – pay insufficient attention to the BRI’s 
domestic contestation and overstates the BRI’s geopolitical implications.  
 
Belt and Road Initiative: Beijing’s masterplan to achieve China’s geopolitical 
dominance?   
Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has put forward a series of significant 
diplomatic initiatives. The most notable is the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), 
comprising the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, 
which was first proposed during Xi’s state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 
September and October of 2013, respectively. The BRI involves large-scale 
investment and infrastructure projects which aim to promote connectivity and 
cooperation between China and the rest of the world. In order to build a more 
favourable international environment to promote the BRI, China has deployed 
substantial resources to construct and disseminate its strategic narratives concerning 
the BRI. Under the state’s call to ‘tell a good BRI story’, a large number of 
conferences have been organized and various delegations have been sent abroad. 
China Daily, for example, even published a series of online videos, in which the BRI 
has become a bedtime story for foreign children (China, 2017). Chinese official 
propaganda points to positive connotations such as ‘win-win’ and ‘common 
development’.  
Yet, those narratives have been widely challenged on the international stage. 
Instead of a “win-win” narrative, that of a “zero-sum” game tends to dominate the 
mainstream analyses of the BRI. Many international analysts point to the geopolitical 
nature of the BRI, implying China’s expansionism is a challenge the US-led global 
order. The BRI is widely seen as China’s ambitious global strategy to build a Sino-
centric world order (Callahan, 2016; Leverett and Wu, 2017; Miller, 2017). Many 
argue that the BRI is China’s Marshall Plan (Chen, 2014; Shen, 2016), but possibly 
much more ambitious; according to this view, China is able to leverage its economic 
strength to achieve geopolitical dominance. Some also revisit the historical origins of 
the Silk Road and Chinese history to argue that the BRI reflects China’s goal of 
reviving the ancient tributary system in which the Middle Kingdom dominates 
(Durani, 2016).  
Collectively, those analyses point to a well-designed grand strategy of the 
Chinese central government to advance Beijing’s geopolitical interests. However, as 
Jones and Zeng (2019) point out, the above analyses overestimate the Chinese central 
government’s capacity to create and implement a clear, coherent, well-defined grand 
strategy. The BRI is never clearly defined; there is not even a correct, official map of 
the BRI (Shepard, 2017). With regards to a list of approved BRI projects, countries 
involved, the amount and sources of BRI funding and the agencies that run the BRI, 
there is either nothing available or information that is full of problems and 
contradictions (Shepard, 2017).  
This paper aims to explain the BRI’s vagueness and contradictions. It argues 
that these are primarily the result of the process by which policy concepts are formed 
in China. Instead of a ‘well-designed’ and ‘clearly defined’ masterplan that is 
envisioned and planned thoroughly, the BRI was put forward as a broad, vague idea 
without a specific blueprint at its inception. The relatively concrete policy content was 
subsequently added by various domestic and international actors and shaped by the 
shifting international landscapes. This has resulted in a BRI plan that is constantly 
evolving from a peripheral strategy targeting China’s neighbouring countries to its 
current form as an extremely inclusive global initiative.  
This also forces the Chinese central government to constantly rebrand its BRI 
narratives at different stages for public relations purposes. For example, the narrative - 
that the BRI as a global initiative is open to all countries - has gradually shifted away 
from the previous ancient Silk Road narrative which is embedded with rich history. 
As Ian Johnson points out, the BRI is not simply a project which was ‘envisioned and 
planned thoroughly, then completed according to that design’, as many see in the 
West (Johnson, 2017, 79). Rather, it is ‘a soft opening’, which occurs when ‘projects 
are first announced to big fanfare, structures erected as declarations of intent, and only 
then filled with content’ (Johnson, 2017, 79). 
While almost all domestic political actors enthusiastically support the central 
government’s call for BRI, this paper argues that those actors take advantage of the 
BRI to advance their own interests rather than the wider geopolitical interests of the 
entirety of China. Chinese provinces have deliberately constructed and disseminated 
their preferred policy narratives of the BRI within and outside of China. This pattern 
confirms Jones’ (2018) regulatory state analysis, in which local and subnational 
political actors may choose to ignore or reinterpret central policy guidelines when 
those guidelines do not match their interests. Using state transformation theory, Jones 
and Zeng (2019) showed that the BRI is kept by the Chinese central government as a 
“loose policy envelope” that reflects domestic actors’ struggle for power and 
resources.  
Built upon this study (Jones and Zeng, 2019), this paper further explores the 
domestic dynamics of the BRI with a focus on policy narratives. It shows how local 
Chinese actors have used their competing BRI narratives to influence the formation of 
the central government’s BRI guidelines. After the central government’s BRI 
guidelines were finalised and released, dissatisfied local actors continued to openly 
produce their narratives to ignore and reinterpret those guidelines. As such, a variety 
of inconsistent, ambiguous, competing narratives have been produced within China. 
This makes it impossible for the central government to forge a coherent Chinese 
policy narrative of the BRI. As a result, the BRI has been overloaded as a catch-all 
policy slogan to justify almost all relevant planned projects and economic plans 
put forward by various domestic actors.  
The findings of this article point to the active, significant role of local actors in 
the BRI. The existing analyses, which consider the BRI as Beijing’s top-down 
masterplan, assume that China is a monolithic state actor and thus pay little attention 
to the role of local actors and the diverse interests within the Chinese political system. 
They point to a relatively passive role of local Chinese actors who work in concert 
under the command of Beijing to advance the central government’s strategic goals. 
This article, however, highlights the regional competition among Chinese provinces 
and local political actors’ ability to (re)shape the central agencies’ BRI plan. It 
demonstrates this by examining the case of Jiangsu, which is one of the most active, 
dynamic provincial actors to engage in the BRI. As I shall discuss, Jiangsu’s 
provincial economic interests have driven it to actively produce and disseminate its 
own narratives to influence, (re)shape and even challenge some central agencies in 
Beijing.  
Indeed, this phenomenon is not new. Similar patterns of the interplay of 
economic interests within the authoritarian system were found, for example, in 
the case of the Go West Campaign, a broad strategic initiative to develop 
western China put forth by the Chinese government in 2000 (Goodman, 2004). 
To some, the BRI has evolved from many ideas of the Go West Campaign 
(Ferdinand, 2016; Summers, 2016). Compared with this initiative, the BRI offers 
much greater international stakes; this is also why some called it the 
international version of the Go West Campaign (Zhao, 2016). The 
internationalisation of the party-state generated by state transformation affords 
local actors more influence on the international stage (Hameiri and Jones, 2016; 
Hameiri et al., 2018), which undermines Beijing’s efforts to articulate its 
preferred Chinese narrative. This is a relatively new challenge for Beijing , 
brought on by China’s economic rise and further integration into the world.  
This is not to say that the domestic competitive dynamic is purely negative for 
the Chinese government and its BRI projects. As has been widely examined in the 
literature on Chinese political economy, the competition among local governments 
induced by China’s fiscal decentralisation or ‘federalism with Chinese characteristics’, 
is considered by some to be the key to China’s market success and economic miracle 
(Qian and Weingast, 1995; Montinola, et al., 1996). To some extent, this is a kind of 
democratic participation process, which helps to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
decision-making process within the one-party system. Nevertheless, when this 
Chinese style of federalism meets foreign relations, it does undermine the Chinese 
central government’s monopoly on its foreign relations and, in this case, the BRI.   
The analyses of this article are based on open source material in both English 
and Chinese and the author’s fieldwork within and outside of China. The article is 
organised as follows: it first explores the formation process of policy concepts in 
China; afterwards, the active role of local Chinese provinces in the BRI are discussed; 
this is followed by a brief case study of Jiangsu. 
 
The formation process of policy ideas and concepts in China 
In China, when top leaders first introduce a new policy idea or concept, it is 
not always clearly defined (Zeng, et al., 2015). The process by which China’s 
academic and policy communities develop a policy idea with concrete substance and 
specific guidelines often occurs subsequently and incrementally. That is to say, 
leaders only offer a broad idea, and the job of developing the specific details of the 
idea is left to various political actors within the system. This allows room for such 
actors to influence the process of policy formation as they see fit, but it may also lead 
to a departure from the original vision of the top leader. This often produces a variety 
of ambiguous and contradictory Chinese narratives, as demonstrated by cases of 
policy concepts including “core interest” (Zeng, et al., 2015; Zeng 2017a), “new type 
of great power relations” (Zeng and Breslin, 2016; Zeng, 2016; Zeng, 2017b), “global 
economic governance” (Zeng, 2019) and “internet sovereignty” (Zeng, et al. 2017).  
Take, for example, the introduction of ‘core interests’, a policy concept 
referring to specific items that represent the non-negotiable bottom line of China’s 
foreign policy. Driven by its significance, various actors/departments within China’s 
political system have tried to interpret and define their own interests as being ‘core’ in 
order to gain more resources and power (Zeng, et al., 2015). This has led to various 
irrelevant interpretations that go against the original policy goal. China’s forestry 
sector, for example, made an effort to promote the ‘grain for green’ project – designed 
to retire farmland in order to address environmental problems such as soil erosion and 
flooding - as a national core interest (Zeng, et al., 2015). This interpretation, based on 
its departmental interests, was a fundamental departure from the original intentions of 
Beijing, which wanted to use core interests to publicise the bottom line of China’s 
foreign policy to an external audience.  
Sometimes, Beijing cannot openly acknowledge its position that a particular 
case is not considered to be a core interest; if Beijing were to do so, it would have to 
face the anger of domestic nationalist sentiment. One such example is the South China 
Sea, in which Beijing must maintain an ambiguous position in order to prevent 
domestic criticism and maintain flexibility for diplomacy at the same time (Campbell, 
et al., 2013); however, this comes at the expense of a coherent foreign policy 
narrative. As Beijing is incapable of openly disapproving of certain narratives and 
interpretations that go against its will, these conflicting and ambiguous messages 
confuse both domestic and international actors.  
In addition, the central government in Beijing is neither capable of nor willing 
to eliminate differing opinions within the system. In many cases, the central 
government has allowed local actors to participate in the decision-making process, 
and it allows some level of contestation and openness, sometimes making necessary 
concessions to legitimise the system and reach consensus. Although this level of 
tolerance may reinforce the authoritarian system and the legitimacy of its decision-
making processes, this article shows how the tolerance has also been exploited by 
local and subnational actors to advance their own agendas. In this regard, the 
authoritarian system is reinforced at the expense of the central government’s efforts to 
coordinate Chinese foreign policies.  
This article argues that the BRI follows the same pattern of policy formation. 
When the BRI was first proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013, it was an extremely vague 
policy idea, with neither a clear definition, nor a blueprint. It took a year and a half for 
the Chinese central government to release relatively more concrete BRI central 
guidelines— Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (V&A) (China, 2015). During (and also after) this 
period, the job of developing this policy slogan with concrete substance was left to 
China’s academic and policy-making communities. Soon after Xi’s announcements, 
many Chinese university scholars and policy analysts in state-affiliated think tanks 
began to shift their research focus to the BRI. Various research projects on this topic 
have been funded, and many academic articles and research reports have since been 
produced. Given its importance, some even suggest that the BRI should be established 
as an independent academic discipline (Wang, 2017), similar, for example, to political 
science or economics. In fact, scholars in differing fields have tried to drag the BRI 
into their specialised fields and load it with their preferred interpretations.  
This has led to a wide range of interpretations of the BRI within China. Some 
argue that it is China’s diplomatic initiative towards developing countries (Zheng and 
Zhang, 2016), suggesting its goal is strengthening China’s strategic ties with 
developing countries. Others consider it as ‘the largest and the most influential 
economic cooperation initiative in world history’ (Jiang, 2015), arguing that its focus 
is on regional economic integration. To Chinese military scholars, it is a call to 
develop the Chinese army, without which China would be unable to secure the 
growing overseas interests brought about by the BRI (Ghiselli, 2015). Given their 
expertise, many Chinese international relations scholars tend to interpret the BRI 
through a geopolitical lens; this goes against the official propaganda of Beijing, a 
point to which I shall return soon. In the end, some of the above studies were adopted 
into government policy,1 but most were not.  
Moreover, the BRI’s evolving nature is also to blame. Beijing’s policy goal for 
the BRI is dynamic rather than static, and that constantly alters it. The BRI has 
evolved through three stages so far (Zeng, 2017b). It was put forth in 2013 as 
peripheral diplomacy (stage 1), which was only about China’s neighbouring countries. 
It soon evolved into stage 2 in 2014 to include Africa and Eastern Europe. A year 
later, in 2015, it reached stage 3 and became a global initiative open to all countries. 
This evolutionary nature has made it very difficult for Beijing to maintain a consistent 
policy narrative in terms of the BRI. The evolving process is driven, according to one 
of my interviewees, by the ‘unexpected enthusiastic’ feedback from international 
actors who want to be a part of the BRI initiative.2 Their strong interest in the BRI and 
their demand to join it have encouraged China to expand its BRI rapidly.  
In addition, shifting geopolitical landscapes also matter in the later development 
of the BRI. To some, the BRI was launched as a counter strategy to the US’s 
‘rebalancing in Asia’ and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Li, 2015; Zhang, 2016). 
These strategies, however, were unexpectedly abandoned by the Trump 
administration. In this new circumstance, both ‘imagined enemies’ of the BRI, Japan 
and the US, are welcome to be a part of it. This dramatic change has altered Beijing’s 
policy and its strategic narratives, again demonstrating that the BRI is a constantly 
evolving, vague Chinese idea which often exceeds Beijing’s expectations, rather than 
a well-designed, clearly defined grand strategy. So, the point to emphasise here is that 
international factors play a crucial role in shaping the BRI and making it depart from 
Beijing’s original narrative.   
   The Chinese government clearly recognizes the power of strategic narratives. 
Indeed, there have been various reflections on how to construct more convincing and 
attractive BRI stories. Some Chinese scholars argue that the Chinese government 
should not embed too many historical elements into their narratives of the BRI, as this 
would lead to a concern over the revival of the ancient tributary system (Zhao, 2015a). 
Others suggest that the local governments should avoid using the term ‘bridgehead’ to 
refer to their role in the BRI, since this kind of military terminology may increase 
other countries’ concerns over the BRI’s geopolitical and military ambition (Zhao, 
2015b). However, this sober advice has been almost completely ignored by local 
governments, which are driven by their own interests. In order to highlight their 
critical roles in the BRI, many Chinese provinces have employed the term 
‘bridgehead’ to brand their cities, as this article will later discuss. 
 Similarly, as previously mentioned, many Chinese academic writings interpret 
the BRI as a geopolitical strategy (Sidaway and Woon, 2017). This apparently 
contradicts the official stance of at least some central agencies in Beijing, which tries 
to avoid such geopolitical narratives of the BRI to create a more favourable 
international environment. For example, as a direct response to those geopolitical 
narratives, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi has commented that the BRI “is a 
product of inclusive cooperation, not a tool of geopolitics, and must not be viewed 
with the outdated Cold War mentality” (MFA, 2015).  
 In order to coordinate domestic narratives, the central government has also tried 
to maintain discipline in the core decision-making community. According to a scholar 
at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), her institute was not ‘allowed’ to 
openly discuss the ‘connotation or the grand implications’ of the BRI after 2015, 
when the V&A was released; they are now asked to focus on its specific 
implementations, such as in the economic and financial industries.3 This instruction 
may only have been effective for those authoritative think tanks. However, it did not 
prevent university researchers and local think tanks from continuing to produce their 
own interpretations of the BRI. Although these local think tanks have less direct 
impact on the decision-making of Beijing’s central agencies, their narratives continue 
to interact with international actors who are not fully able to differentiate between 
authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese voices. This is particularly true when 
these policy narratives serve the political interests of local actors; this is discussed in 
the following section.  
 
Policy narratives from below  
As previously mentioned, the process of fulfilling top leaders’ policy ideas has 
generated various interpretations and narratives which do not necessarily reflect the 
original intentions of the leaders. In this regard, the introduction of the BRI is similar 
to that of other policy concepts/ideas, such as “core interest” (Zeng, et al., 2015; Zeng 
2017a), “new type of great power relations” (Zeng and Breslin, 2016; Zeng, 2016; 
Zeng, 2017b), “global economic governance” (Zeng, 2019) and “internet sovereignty” 
(Zeng, et al. 2017). A different understanding and evaluation of the international order 
and China’s power status, for example, has often led to very different, if not 
contradictory, interpretations and narratives of the official lines (Zeng, et al., 2015).  
Beyond this divergence of ideas, what makes the case of the BRI more 
complicated are the enormous business/economic interests — estimated to cost over 
$1 trillion (Kuo and Kommenda, 2018). Such tremendous economic interests have 
motivated both international and domestic actors. Within China, various political 
actors have taken advantage of this initiative to maximise their individual interests. 
This profit-seeking behaviour has led to intense competition within the Chinese 
political system.  
Indeed, this competition started immediately after, if not before, Xi’s 
announcement of the BRI in 2013. Taking the competition among Chinese provinces 
as an example, obtaining a larger place in a national project, such as the BRI, usually 
translates to economic benefits including receiving more policy support (such as 
financial support and tax relief) from the central government. Thus, local provinces 
have been very enthusiastic in echoing the central government’s call for the BRI. 
Chinese provinces have made great efforts to lobby the central government, in which 
public relations campaigns play an important role.  
As mentioned above, it took the Chinese central government a year and a half to 
release the BRI guidelines – the V&A - after Xi announced the vague idea of the BRI 
in late 2013. During this period, Chinese provinces took advantage of its vagueness to 
inject their own interests and visions into the V&A—a process of arguing their 
relevance with little similarity among their visions except that their specific province 
is particularly important to the BRI and, thus, deserves more support from the central 
government. In order to influence and (re)shape the BRI in their favour, Chinese 
provinces have carefully constructed and disseminated policy narratives to legitimise 
their political requests for the BRI. Various academic and media resources in their 
control have been intensively used for this purpose.  
On the one hand, local university academic and policy analysts in local state-
affiliated think tanks were encouraged to conduct research and provide reasoning to 
support their provinces’ requests. This led to the aforementioned massive number of 
academic articles and research reports on the BRI, which provide a wide range of 
competing interpretations and narratives of the Silk Road. On the other hand, local 
provinces use their media resources, such as local newspapers, to launch public 
relations campaigns to disseminate their preferred policy narratives regarding the BRI. 
All official provincial newspapers have actively engaged with the topic of the BRI.4  
The public campaigns launched by Chinese provinces have produced many 
competing BRI narratives. For example, they have further intensified the existing 
academic debate among Chinese historians over the historical origins of the ancient 
Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road; however, even before the BRI, this academic 
debate was complicated by pragmatic business interests because cities with richer 
historical origins were more likely to win heritage funds and develop their tourism 
industries. The announcement of the BRI further intensified the impact of economic 
interests on this academic debate.  
Taking the origination point of the Silk Road as an example, both Shaanxi and 
Henan Provinces claimed their own cities Xi’an and Luoyang, respectively, as the 
origination point of the ancient Silk Road (Zhang and Li, 2014). Both provincial 
governments have spent considerable resources funding research projects supporting 
their claims and constructing policy narratives in their favour. The competition over 
the origination point of the Maritime Silk Road was even more intense and chaotic. 
Competitors in the south-eastern coastal provinces include Fujian, Jiangsu and 
Guangdong. Fujian Province, for example, uses the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) recognition to claim that its city 
Quanzhou is the origination point (Shi, 2014). As Quanzhou ‘had always been a key 
port of the maritime Silk Road since the Song Dynasty’, the Quanzhou party secretary 
requested that the central government provide more policy support for Quanzhou’s 
Maritime Silk Road activities (Shi, 2014). Instead of Quanzhou, Jiangsu Province’s 
Deputy Director of the Department of Culture and Museum Director of Nanjing, 
Gong Liang, argues that ‘the real origination point should be in Jiangsu’ (Lu, 2015). 
According to Gong, it is Jiangsu that connects the onshore Silk Road and the 
Maritime Silk Road, and the rise of the latter in Jiangsu led to the gradual decline of 
the former (Lu, 2015). The governor of Guangdong Province, Zhu Xiaodan, argues 
that Guangzhou is also one of the origination points (Zhu, et al., 2016). Similarly, to 
Guangxi Province, it sees its city, Beihai, as the origination point. 5  
Those who were not so historically connected to the Silk Road also wanted to 
stay relevant. As a result, they made various attempts to redefine and expand the so-
called origination point. New concepts such as the ‘southern origination point’, 
‘northern origination point’, ‘porcelain origination point’ and ‘tea origination point’ 
were invented and put forth by various provinces to prove their relevance in this 
Maritime Silk Road plan. For example, China’s north-eastern provinces, Shandong 
and Hebei, claimed their own cities Qingdao (Qiao, 2015) and Huanghua (Cui, 2014), 
respectively, as the so-called ‘north origination point’.  
Chinese provinces have also actively disseminated their BRI narratives to the 
international audience. For example, they have funded and organised numerous 
international seminars and conferences to discuss their roles in the BRI. International 
delegations are invited to these meetings, which often become opportunities for local 
provinces to disseminate their narratives. Similarly, the Chinese delegations from 
Sichuan and Guangxi, which I met in the UK, were keen to highlight the unique, key 
roles of their respective provinces in the BRI.6 While the larger impact of public 
relations campaigns may serve the interests of local provinces, such campaigns have 
been carried out at the expense of the central government’s efforts to project its 
preferred narratives to the international audience. As will be discussed later, this 
remains the case, even after the release of the V&A.  
 In the end, some provinces’ lobbying strategies were quite successful in 
injecting their agendas and interests into the V&A. Others, however, failed. After a 
year and a half of lobbying and public relations campaigns, the competition was 
concluded in the official BRI central guidelines – the V&A – and released on 28 
March 2015. A total of 18 provinces were highlighted in this official document (China, 
2015). This final version of the V&A is different from previous versions. For example, 
in late 2013, 15 provinces were invited to the BRI symposium organized by China’s 
Development and Reform Commission (China, 2013); this indicates that only those 
15 provinces were part of the BRI blueprint at that time. Later, some provinces that 
did not appear in this symposium, such as Inner Mongolia (China, 2013), managed to 
win places in the final version of the V&A. Others, such as Shandong, which engaged 
in a high-profile lobbying campaign, failed to be included in its entirety, although two 
of its cities were included (China, 2015). In this regard, Shandong is not completely 
excluded from the V&A; perhaps this indicates a compromise solution between the 
central and local governments.  
 
The case of Jiangsu Province 
 The exclusion of Jiangsu province was more surprising and embarrassing, as it 
was universally considered to play a key role in the BRI. Unlike Shandong, Jiangsu 
was invited to the aforementioned symposium in December 2013 (China, 2013). 
During his visit to Jiangsu in December 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed 
out that Jiangsu was the ‘intersection point’ of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
Maritime Silk Road and that it should actively participate in the BRI (Jiangsu, 2015). 
Xi’s words further raised public and internal expectations about Jiangsu’s role in the 
BRI. Thus, Jiangsu framed itself as the intersection point of the BRI in its public 
relations campaign.  
 The Jiangsu provincial government also highlighted its city, Lianyungang, as 
the ‘east bridgehead’ of the BRI. On 10 January 2015, the Lianyungang municipal 
government discussed and approved a specific implementation plan to construct itself 
as the intersection point of the BRI (Yang, 2015). On 13 January 2015, a journalist 
from Shanghai Securities claimed that the draft version of the V&A had confirmed 
Lianyungang as the ‘node city’ (Zhu, 2015). On 25 March 2015, Shanghai Securities 
again confirmed this information, claiming that the port of Lianyungang was listed in 
the ‘only’ coastal port construction projects of the BRI (CNSTOCK, 2015). All of 
these news reports were proven wrong.  
 Even more embarrassing, two hours before the V&A was released by the central 
government, Jiangsu’s governor, Li Xueyong, delivered a speech on Jiangsu’s 
contribution to the BRI at the Bo’ao Forum — an important policy forum that was 
considered to be an indicator of China’s policy direction. In that specific year, the 
Bo’ao Forum gave Jiangsu some publicity spotlights by organising an exchange 
meeting exclusively for Jiangsu to promote itself. Contrary to all these media and 
public expectations, Jiangsu went completely unmentioned in the V&A, and not one 
of its cities, even Lianyungang, was mentioned. At the time, the failure of Jiangsu 
immediately hit the headlines of the Chinese official and social media (Xiaodan, 
2015). It was considered to be the ‘saddest’ province in this round of the BRI 
competition (Xiao, 2015).  
 While the V&A concluded the central government’s plan for the BRI, it did not 
serve as the means of reaching consensus and, thus, a unified and coherent BRI 
narrative. Instead, its exclusion of certain provincial actors led to some counter-
effects—the V&A was implicitly and explicitly reinterpreted by local actors. The 
most extreme case is that of Jiangsu, which was unexpectedly excluded from the 
V&A. Some Jiangsu officials openly said that they were struck by the fact that 
Jiangsu went unmentioned in the central guidelines and ‘their enthusiasm towards 
work is still in the process of slow adjustment’ (Ding, 2015b). Some prefecture-level 
cities even considered appealing jointly to the central government (Ding, 2015b).  
In addition, a few officials and scholars openly questioned the V&A and 
challenged the fact that Jiangsu was not included. According to the deputy director of 
the Jiangsu provincial government’s counselling office, Liu Zhibiao, the exclusion of 
Lianyungang in the V&A is ‘mismatched, unwise and unusual’ (Xiaodan, 2015). Liu 
also quoted the comment of Zhang Bujia, a consultant to Jiangsu’s System Reform 
Society and President of the Provincial Association of Shareholding Enterprises, who 
said that “if there is no Longhai (traffic artery starting from Jiangsu linking Eastern 
and Western China) line, how come there is a silk road?’ (Xiaodan, 2015). These 
comments were also openly endorsed by Gu Longgao, the Deputy Director of the 
Centre for Coastal Development and Bridge Studies at Jiangsu Academy of Social 
Science, who considered the exclusion of Jiangsu in the V&A ‘very odd’ (Wang, 
2015). 
The Jiangsu government downplayed the fact that neither the province nor any 
of its cities were mentioned in the V&A. According to the party secretary of Jiangsu, 
to implement the BRI strategy was not ‘a simple geographical concept’, and, thus, 
‘there is no outsider in this national strategy’ (Wang, 2015). During its working 
meeting, the Jiangsu provincial leadership also used the aforementioned words of Xi 
Jinping during his visit to Jiangsu to legitimise the importance of Jiangsu in the BRI. 
It is argued that Jiangsu, as an ‘intersection point’ of the BRI, is in an explicit position 
given by the paramount leader, Xi Jinping (Jiangsu, 2015). As a result, Jiangsu 
Province continued to insist on its importance in the BRI, thus retaining its relevant 
projects and plans.  
The reinterpretation process also happened simultaneously. In facing the widely 
discussed fact that Jiangsu went unmentioned, Jiangsu Province immediately put forth 
its interpretations of the V&A to justify its original plans. On 29 March 2015, one day 
after the V&A was released, the Lianyungang newspaper media group published an 
article in which a few Jiangsu officials were invited to give their interpretations of the 
role of Lianyungang in the V&A (Zhou, 2015). In this article, Gu Longgao argues 
that Lianyungang is still important in both the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
Maritime Silk Road. According to Gu:  
 
. . . the central guidelines explicitly pointed that ‘New Eurasian Continental 
Bridge is the first channel of Silk Road Economic Belt’. So far, at least four 
national documents explicitly mentioned Lianyugang as ‘the East 
Bridgehead of New Eurasian Continental Bridge’. Thus, Lianyungang is a 
well-deserved bridgehead city on the Silk Road (Zhou, 2015).  
 
With regard to the Maritime Silk Road, although Lianyungang is not one of the 
many port cities mentioned in the V&A, Gu argues that this does not mean 
unmentioned port cities ‘have nothing to do with the Maritime Silk Road. It is 
because other port cities have their own Port trade circle and influence, and 
Lianyungang is no exception. With Lianyungang’s increasing influence in Central 
Asia and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it will become an indispensable 
transport hub city of Maritime Silk Road’ (Zhou, 2015).  
In other words, Jiangsu’s narrative of the V&A highlights other national 
documents, as well as Xi Jinping’s personal words, to support Jiangsu’s importance in 
the BRI, suggesting that the V&A is not the only authoritative source. So, the 
argument goes, even if Jiangsu goes unmentioned in the V&A, this does not mean that 
Jiangsu has no role in the BRI as Jiangsu’s geographic importance speaks for itself. 
This interpretation represents an obvious and open challenge to the authority and 
legitimacy of the V&A released by central agencies in Beijing.  
Not surprisingly, although the V&A was not what Jiangsu expected, it has 
not significantly changed Jiangsu’s BRI plans. Jiangsu is sticking to its original 
BRI plans and narratives with minor modifications. This is clearly demonstrated 
in Jiangsu’s docking implementation plan to respond the V&A. In this plan, 
Jiangsu continues to frame itself as the intersection point of the BRI, and its cities 
- Lianyungang and Xuzhou - are put forth as the major node cities of the New 
Eurasian Continental Bridge Economic Corridor (Ding, 2015b). After the V&A 
was released in March 2015, Lianyungang’s implementation plan, for example, 
only changed slightly from the previous version drafted on 10 January 2015. 
According to Gu Longgao, ‘no significant change would be made’  (Ding, 2015a).   
Despite the fact that Jiangsu’s response clearly suggests tensions caused 
by the V&A, all of the above comments from Jiangsu were all made openly on 
Chinese media and not censored at the time of writing. Jiangsu’s response is 
exceptional. After all, only four out of 34 provincial units went completely 
unmentioned in the V&A (i.e., neither its province nor any of its cities was 
included). The response of the other three provinces (Hebei, Shanxi and 
Guizhou) were quieter than Jiangsu as they had not been invited to the 
symposium in December 2013 and thus had lower expectations of their role in the 
V&A. In addition, compared with Jiangsu, their lower level of economic development 
and globalisation has also made them less competitive in fighting for the central 
government’s favour.    
A consequent question here is why Jiangsu was excluded from the V&A 
despite the fact that its role in the BRI was openly endorsed by the Chinese 
president, Xi Jinping. To some, Jiangsu’s Lianyungang was simply not 
competitive enough when many other provinces also branded their cities as the 
new bridgeheads and nodes of the BRI (Shiju, 2015). Others point to the fact that 
Jiangsu does not possess decent coastal cities and harbours, despite its long 
coastline (Shiju, 2015). However, there is so far no evidence available to prove or 
disprove these speculations.  
In short, local state actors have deliberately produced and disseminated 
their preferred policy narratives to influence the central government and also 
public opinion. These local policy narratives often conflict rather than work in 
concert. In extreme cases, such as the aforementioned Jiangsu, local political 
actors may reinterpret and challenge the central government’s policy guidelines 
when they do not coincide with their interests. In this regard, the domestic 
competition dynamic among Chinese provinces has posed a challenge for the 
central government and its BRI. As Yu (2017) points out, this lack of central-
local coordination looks remarkably confusing to international actors who have 
no clear idea about the exact Chinese agencies in charge of BRI and with whom 
to negotiate about the BRI project.  
In the wider context of China’s political economy, this reflects China’s 
central-local relations. Thirty years of scholarship in China’s political economy 
has detailed how China’s market reform and fiscal decentralization have 
transformed the central-local relations by allowing greater local fiscal 
autonomy and significantly weakened the control of the central state in local 
economic activities (Wong, 1991; Breslin, 1996). The local economic policies 
pursued by local states to advance their own interests often undermine the 
economic and political interests of China at the macro level. With China’s 
globalisation, this central-local relation has a growing impact on China’s 
foreign relations. As the state transformation analysis observes  (Hameiri and 
Jones, 2016; Jones, 2018), the “internationalisation” of local states has allowed 
its greater access to international society, and thus higher international 
influence and greater transnational economic interests. This often provides 
local states more capacity and motivation to conduct economic activities to 
advance their interests on the international stage. As a result, Chinese 
provincial actors have played an increasing role in shaping China’s foreign 
relations (Wong, 2018; Jian, et al., 2010; Cheung and Tang, 2001).  
This phenomenon has inevitable consequences for the central 
government’s monopoly on China’s foreign policy and do not necessarily serve 
China’s national interests at the macro level. This is demonstrated by the case 
of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE), which massively expanded overseas 
as a result of China’s rise. As a majority of those SOEs are provincial -level 
SOEs and heavily influenced by local states, provincial governments become 
key players in China’s oversea corporate engagement strategy. However, their 
interests often conflict with other relevant central agencies in Beijing including 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce and the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council  (Gill 
and Reilly, 2007). These conflicting interests combined with the profit-seeking 
corporate nature contribute in part to the vicious competition among Chinese 
SOEs in bidding on overseas infrastructure projects, which seriously damaged 
China’s national image and interests.  
The state transformation has also brought increased autonomy to SOEs, 
thereby reducing the central agencies’ control over SOE overseas activities. As 
the study of Jones and Zou (2017) on Chinese SOEs in Myanmar shows, 
Chinese SOEs “clearly defied and subverted central regulations” for the sake of 
corporate profit, leading to the damage of official Sino-Myanmar relations, 
while central agencies in Beijing are struggling to deal with the situation. So, 
the points to emphasise are: (a) due to their own interests, like Chinese 
provinces, Chinese SOEs are not always under the full command of central 
agencies in Beijing; and (b) as provincial-level SOEs partly reflect the interests 
of provincial governments, their overseas actions can conflict with the goals of 
other SOE managing agencies in Beijing.   
 
Conclusion   
 Previous literature notes the difficulty democratic states have in forging a 
coherent strategic narrative. Miskimmon’s analysis, for example, shows how the 
European Union (EU) is incapable of finding a unified voice due to its governance 
mechanism (Miskimmon, 2017). What is often less noticed, however, is that 
authoritarian regimes also suffer from similar problems to some extent. The 
authoritarian system in China is often considered in the literature of international 
politics as a single monolithic political entity in which there is a unified and ‘highly 
centralised’ system (Hill, 2016, 243) for Beijing to mobilise in order to attain 
centrally established objectivities. A significant portion of the literature on China 
studies, however, has pointed to fragmentation and decentralisation within the 
authoritarian system (Schurmann, 1966; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988). The rise of 
globalisation has also contributed to this phenomenon and led to the 
internationalisation of China’s party-state (Hameiri and Jones, 2016), which gives 
local actors the ability and willingness to shape China’s foreign relations and 
undermine the central government’s monopoly on foreign policy.  
 Even when it comes to significant national projects, such as the BRI, which are 
associated with the top leader Xi Jinping’s personal authority and introduced into the 
Chinese Communist Party’s constitution, Beijing’s central agencies are often not fully 
capable of coordinating political actors within China and producing one unified 
official Chinese narrative. It is particularly notable that all of this happened under Xi 
Jinping’s leadership, during which period various significant reform projects had 
already been launched to centralise power and strengthen the authority of the central 
government (Wang and Zeng, 2016). During the era of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, 
who was famous for power sharing and consensus building, the fragmentation of 
authority and diverse policy narratives were even more prevalent.  
As a normative power, the democratic EU is proud of its diversity, multinational 
identity and democratic process, at least in its rhetoric; however, these values are less 
likely to be appreciated by the Chinese government. More importantly, because of the 
aforementioned conventional view of the Chinese political system as a single 
monolithic political entity, the conflicting messages sent from China, especially by 
the Chinese governmental entities, are more confusing on the international stage. 
International society has a more advanced understanding of and is more familiar with 
democracies such as the EU. People simply become accustomed to open, conflicting 
policy debates and take them for granted in Western liberal democracies. As a result, 
there is a slightly more sophisticated understanding of the differences between those 
views and, for example, the official policy of Brussels.  
Yet, when it comes to the much more opaque authoritarian system in China, it 
often leads to confusion and (un)conscious misinterpretation. Certain views of 
Chinese local governments/ministries or scholars are more likely to be taken seriously 
and are sometimes mistakenly considered the central government’s official stance.7 
This can be due to the limited understanding of China’s authoritarian system, even 
though the Western scholarship on Chinese politics has generated sound knowledge in 
this regard. To China’s central government, this is quite undesirable for its strategic 
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